What are the duties of academics? - ABC Religion & Ethics (2024)

In recent years, Australian academics have been accused of many forms of wrongful expression — including racism, transphobia, and antisemitism. These accusations often bring with them calls for disciplinary intervention on the part of universities. Such incidents raise questions about the limits of academic freedom, and about what makes constraint and censure of academic speech legitimate.

A recent controversy surrounds the University of Melbourne’s draft “gender affirmation policy”, which would prohibit speeches or events on the grounds that they harm transgender and gender-diverse members of the university community. The target of this policy appears to be the discussion of “gender critical” views, which distinguish between gender and biological sex, and maintain that biological sex is politically important. Critics argue that this policy expands the relevant notion of “harm” and represents a major potential constraint on academic freedom.

Political convictions mediate interpretations of these events. Some are more likely to emphasise concerns about purportedly harmful speech by academics, and to interpret constraints on academic expression as an essential part of protecting marginalised members of society. Others are more likely to emphasise concerns about the negative effects of limiting academic freedom. They may interpret their stance as an essential part of larger efforts to resist illiberal cultural trends.

To evaluate these challenging issues, we need to understand the value of the university in a liberal society. We must also appreciate the many roles of academics within the university, and within the wider democratic ecosystem.

The pursuit of truth

It is common to claim that universities have the special function of facilitating the pursuit of truth. The pursuit of truth requires open and fearless discussion of ideas, including controversial, false, and even sometimes immoral ideas. According to this view, censuring academics for their speech is incompatible with the rigorous pursuit of truth, and hence with the foundational purpose of the university.

While this common line of thought is important, and establishes a strong presumption in favour of protecting academic speech, it cannot be the end of the story. First, the university has other important functions: for example, educating students, preparing them for life after university, and improving public debate. Second, some campus speech does constitute unjustifiable harm. Genuinely harmful speech can be constrained when its exercise violates the rights of others, for instance their right to non-discrimination.

To better assess the expressive limits of academic freedom, it is useful to distinguish between three central aspects of academic work: teaching, research, and public engagement.

Roles and obligations

As teachers, academics are, of course, tasked with facilitating the pursuit of truth. But they are also responsible for cultivating a respectful environment, which gives students fair opportunities to grow intellectually. This requires presenting material in ways that do not demean, subordinate, or intimidate.

That is one way to understand some important contemporary critiques. In their teaching practices, the offending academic expresses callous and unprofessional disrespect for some of their students, which can undermine the fairness that these students are entitled to demand. We believe that this analysis applies to those who refuse to employ a student’s preferred gender pronounsor to call them by their chosen name. Such behaviour is demeaning: it singles out the relevant student, jeopardising their equal status in the classroom. And it is unnecessary, since academics have wide latitude to challenge gender norms in research, teaching, and public speaking, in ways that do not so directly affect the educational environment of a small number of particular students. Even those who interpret this as a conflict between an academic’s freedom of conscience and a student’s educational experience should give priority to the latter in teaching environments, given the importance of equality in educational opportunity.

As researchers, academics should primarily be interested in pursuing the truth. They should not turn away from compelling evidence in order to produce research that confirms their political views, just as they should not minimise findings that challenge the views of their students or their employers. Similarly, research should not be constrained merely on the grounds that it might have bad effects. Valuable research often has some bad effects. A prominent US economist published surprising results which challenge the common assumption that black Americans are disproportionately likely to encounter lethal force in encounters with police. These findings have, predictably and mistakenly, been used to argue that there is no racism in policing. We are very sceptical about arguments that assume bad political consequences like this are sufficient to limit the freedom of academics to pursue the research that interests them.

It is important to distinguish the first critique from the second. The animating claim of the first is not that the speech might cause later harm, but that it constitutes harm on its own. Demeaning students is harmful in itself. And it violates principles of fairness in education. So the relevant question is: when does academic speech constitute harm in this way?

The harmfulness of controversial ideas?

It is our view that causing distress, hurt feelings, or discomfort in students cannot be sufficient on its own — even if this distress is significant.

Socialists may feel discomfort in a class on macroeconomics. Indigenous students may feel confronted in a class on Australian literature. Students committed to the literal truth of the bible may feel distress in a class on evolutionary biology. Rape survivors may feel disrespected in a class on criminal law. Pacifists may feel outrage in a class on just war theory. These reactions deserve to be taken seriously, especially by teachers deciding how to present potentially disturbing material. But taking them seriously does not mean ensuring that they never arise. It is unavoidable that some students will be offended and distressed by material they encounter at university — just as they will be offended and distressed by material they encounter in society more broadly.

Student distress is sometimes a sign that instructors are engaging in unacceptable classroom behaviour. An economics professor should not gratuitously mock their anti-capitalist students, even if the students exhibit poor reasoning. Similarly, professors teaching gender critical views should not insult, intimidate, or silence the students who passionately disagree with them.

Instructors can be appropriately censured for violating their professional duties if they behave in a manner that is demeaning, subordinating, or intimidating. There is a strong presumption in favour of academic freedom, however, when the cause of distress is the mere discussion of academic material, even if this material is controversial.

Some will believe that our position about when academic speech constitutes unjustifiable harm tells in a particular (reactionary? milquetoast liberal?) political direction. In the current global climate, that judgment is particularly surprising. Conservatives in parts of the United States have sought and enacted wide-ranging legal regulations limiting discussions of “Critical Race Theory” in schools and universities. As justification, they have invoked the spectre of students feeling discomfort, guilt, anguish, and other forms of psychological distress in relation to discussions of race and racism. Australian progressives should be attuned to the ways that more expansive notions of harmful expression are already being employed by those unsympathetic to progressive aims, and to liberal education more generally.

Academic speech in the public square

How about public engagement? Are there distinctive norms that apply to academics when they contribute to popular culture?

Modern universities increasingly fetishise measurable “impact”, encouraging academics to seek a broader audience for their work. This can incentivise provocative behaviour, behaviour which may be in tension with the pursuit of truth or productive public debate. We think that academics have special professional and civic obligations to improve knowledge and discourse, which should sometimes override activist commitments. Academics have unique opportunities to contribute to collaborative relations in civil society, and they should not take these special opportunities for granted.

But it should also be remembered that academics are not only researchers and teachers. They are members of wider society. As such, they enjoy the same general protections as other citizens in the public square.

While it may be that all citizens have a moral obligation to engage respectfully in public discourse, it will usually be unacceptable to make this into a legal requirement (excepting narrowly tailored regulations on actual hate speech). It is dangerous for universities to sanction academics for public speech that does not directly affect their academic work, just as it is dangerous for corporations to sanction employees for extramural expression when it does not directly affect the work they perform for the corporation. This is so even when the speech in question is less judicious and respectful than would be appropriate in a classroom setting.

For these reasons, it seems to us that James Cook University was wrong to invoke the putative wrong of discourteous behaviour in order to fire Peter Ridd for his criticism of the work of his colleagues on climate change. Limiting the freedom of academics to criticise their colleagues in public is dangerous. Any constraints on this score must be narrow and precisely defined; irritating debate about research is not enough. Similarly, the University of Illinois was wrong to rescind the (accepted) offer of employment to Steven Salaita because of his intemperate tweets about Israel’s actions in Palestine.

More needs to be said on issues relating to academic speech. But given the importance of academic freedom for the pursuit of truth and the other goals of the university, outside of the case of clearly demeaning, subordinating, or intimidating speech, there is reason to put the burden of showing a clear harm that goes beyond hurt feelings or distress on those making the claim. Unless this can be accomplished persuasively, there are insufficient grounds for limiting the speech in question.

Luara Ferracioli is a Senior Lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University of Sydney.

Matthew Lister is a Senior Lecturer in Deakin Law School.

Samuel Shpall is Senior Lecturer in Ethics at the University of Sydney.